In June 1961, the USN and JSDF prepare a series of provocative moves into the Sea of Okhotsk. Well, in real life they didn’t, but in my Command scenario “The Okhotsk Bastion”, they did. The Soviet forces there are somewhat historical, save for a hypothetical carrier and its assorted aircraft.

The actual scen is very slow (it is after all, an anti-submarine scenario with very limited equipment), but I went to the editor, rearranged the small JSDF task group and the southernmost fleet of subchasers, and got-the biggest fleet engagement since World War II.

To put this in perspective-it was between three Japanese ships and eight Soviet subchasers. The former’s “fleet” consisted of a recent yet still low-end frigate, an IJN-surplus anti-sub vessel, and a coastal minesweeper with a deck gun. The latter had medium and small ships. No ship in the engagement had more than 1,400 tons displacement. None had anything bigger than a 120mm turret.

The JSDF lost the new frigate. The Soviets lost one large and four small subchasers. There were limited aerial engagements.

Book after book would be written on the engagement.

When you have such a small sample size, the data will be obsessed over.

This explains why so much naval warfare has been theoretical-not just since World War II, but since the development of the steam engine. A combination of rapid technological progress mixed with few samples (thanks to both the high capital costs of ships and Anglo-American naval supremacy) has made wargaming and simulation crucial.

So when looking at alternate history Command scens, it’s interesting to see how influential they might have been in their timelines that never were.

 

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