A review of Walt Gragg’s The Red Line is up at Fuldapocalypse Fiction. Enjoy.
So I read Ralph Peters’ Red Army, one of the fewer classic World War III novels I hadn’t read yet. A part of me doesn’t want to look a gift horse in the mouth. This is better-written than many of its contemporaries and well-intended. It isn’t just the grit of the battles that works, but how Peters, unlike so many other writers in the genre, goes light on the technical terminology. It still has a little too much viewpoint-hopping, but flows well. In that, I’m reminded of Team Yankee doing a similar thing, and both books are good “counters” to each other.
However, I still have some criticism. A lot of the characterization is done through telling and not showing, and while the viewpoint hopping is smoothed over, it still exists. Also, I think the two main parts of the book are at cross-purposes. The intent is to tell a ground-eye-view story that humanizes the Soviets and a cautionary tale of how NATO could lose. They don’t quite gel, and a lot of the high-level viewpoint characters are infodumpers that make it a little ham-fisted.
The last major comment I have is that the book has a lot of its power lost when read by a history enthusiast several decades later. All the “classics” have this issue too, and it’s not the fault of their writers. But the big “punch” of this is a softball to someone who already knew about the issues that plagued NATO for its entire Cold War existence that the book brings up.
But this is still a worthy Cold War Hot novel that any enthusiast should pick up. I still recommend it.
IE, two good but fundamentally different Cold War novels, idealized American vs. ideal Soviet, star-spangled spectacular American win vs. gritty Soviet win. The readable but horribly erratic Chieftains (let’s say I’ll just be talking more about that book later) can’t quite serve as Coyle’s foil. This can.
Over at Baloogan Campaign, I have a post on the three major games that led me on the path to Command: Modern Air Naval Operations. Those games are Advance Wars, Steel Panthers, and Fleet Command.
Read the post here.
One of my favorite looking tanks is the infamous M60A2 “Starship”.
The tank itself had a deservedly short and unglorious career. Its 152mm gun-missile system and electronics were, er, less-than-ideal, and after only a few years most were either converted back to conventional 105mm M60s or support vehicles, where they served well. But its unique turret just looks fascinating to me. It’s ugly. But that’s part of the charm.
Today is the 74th anniversary of the nearly-successful attempt to kill Hitler.
A lot of alternate history in popular imagination tends to focus too much on “For Want of a Nail” style events. Those have existed, but the July 20 Plot was not one of them overall. The conspirators were not Adenauer-ian liberals, but nationalists who the Allies would never have negotiated with. Moreover, the plan was extremely unlikely to succeed in gaining control of the government even if Hitler had died-the result would probably have been either Goering or, if he had died or been ousted in the chaos, some military junta ruling Germany for the last year of war. Likely, very little would have changed.
While many designs and prototypes of larger-than-normal tanks were made, the only American heavy tank to reach a degree of production was the M103. Even then, the Marines were more enthusiastic about it than the Army.
But the army had worked heavy tanks into their doctrine. And they were primarily tank destroyers. Not completely, like the purpose-built TDs of WWII, but organized very similarly.
According to the 1949/1951 edition of FM 17-33, when heavy tanks were “brewing”:
“The missions of the heavy tank battalion are:
a. To provide antitank protection, in both offense and defense, against enemy tanks.
b. To support the advance of the medium tank and armored infantry battalions.
c. To perform, in addition, the missions normally assigned to the medium tank battalion.”
Note the prioritization. Paragraph 254 is even more explict and similar to the initial wartime tank destroyer doctrine.
“The heavy tank battalion of the armored division normally will be given an antitank mission in both the mobile and sustained defense. When attached to the combat commands or the reserve command, the battalion, or its companies, usually will be held in reserve, ready to move out to meet any enemy threat, especially by tanks superior in capabilities to the medium tank.”
Now, other roles for the heavy tank, including the breakthrough/support role its eastern counterparts were primarily envisioned for (and which it was designed to stop) were mentioned, this was not inflexible. But the focus was on the anti-tank role.
Prior to the introduction of “smart” weapons, attacking tanks directly with aircraft was, in purely materialistic terms, incredibly difficult and certainly inefficient.
While pilots claimed massive numbers of tank kills, careful examination when the dust settled revealed a different story. In WWII, it was 5-8%, depending on how you fiddle with statistics. By Korea, the 100% confirmed aircraft kills of tanks had risen only modestly, to 12%. Granted, this is a slight lowball figure because a lot of the “unknown” losses were to aircraft napalm. If every single “unknown cause” loss turned out to be due to aircraft, it would rise to 40%, but this is doubtful, and the modest point still stands.
As this video shows, attacking and disrupting the soft-skinned support elements was something air power at the time was far better equipped to handle.
One thing I’m legitimately curious about (and haven’t read that much on, hence my curiosity) is the height to which “dumb” (albeit ballistic computer-assisted) rockets and bombs could reach with postwar technology.